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ABSTRACT 
The article investigates the role of technological change, HR practices, and institutional organiza-
tional differences in training participation of low skilled workers in Germany. By building on insti-
tutional theories four hypotheses are derived and tested. Regression analysis based on the IAB Es-
tablishment Survey (wave 2011 and 2013) show evidence that the training participation of low 
skilled workers is shaped by organizational characteristics in terms of advanced production technol-
ogy, investments in EDP, organizational or technological innovation, institutionalized arrangements 
and HR policies. While the effects of technology and innovations are of short-term nature, institu-
tionalized arrangements in terms of employee representations and formalized HR practices have an 
enduring effect: They are positively associated with both a higher likelihood of training investments 
in low skilled workers and higher rates of continuing training participation among low skilled 
workers in 2011 and 2013. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In all European societies low skilled workers 
face particular labor market risks in terms of 
unemployment, bad working conditions, or low 
pay (Eurofound 2009). These risks will further 
increase with ongoing changes in the world of 
work, often leading to higher skill requirements 
and a shrinking demand for unskilled work. 
According to calculations of the German Insti-
tute for Employment Research (IAB) 45% of 
the tasks that are recently performed by low 
skilled workers are routine tasks, which could 
technically be substituted by computers or 
computer driven machines (Dengler & Matthes 
2015). Though the actual effects of the digital 
transformation on low skilled jobs are still sub-
ject of debates and research (Hirsch-Kreinsen 
2016) there is at the same time wide consensus 
that continuing training forms a key measure to 
respond to these developments by improving 
digital skills, labor market opportunities, and 
career prospects for low skilled workers (Mar-
tin & Rüber 2016; Mohr et al. 2016: 553). It is 
the crucial question of the paper how low 
skilled workers can be better integrated in em-
ployer-provided continuing training in Germa-
ny. 
According to representative establishment data 
only one out of two companies in Germany has 
devoted (working) time or money to continuing 
training in 2017 (IAB 2017). While 40% of the 
skilled workers took part in continuing training, 
the share among the low-skilled workers (doing 
work that does not require a vocational educa-
tion) was only 20% (IAB 2017; see also 
Janssen and Leber 2015: 6). 
The low training participation of low-skilled 
workers raises questions for both the underly-
ing obstacles as well as possible pathways to 
overcome them. While there is a relative broad 
literature on training participation in general 
few studies have focused on the particular 
group of low skilled workers (see Bellmann et 
al. 2015; Mohr et al. 2016; Martin and Rüber 
2016). Moreover, the role of the institutional 
company context did not receive much atten-
tion, so far. Studies addressing the training par-
ticipation of low skilled workers have been 
mainly concerned with determinants like labor 
shortages (Bellmann et al. 2015) or task charac-
teristics (Mohr et al. 2016). The role of institu-
tional differences between organizations, in 
terms of collective bargaining coverage, em-
ployee representation, or HR practices, have 
neither been explored systematically nor ad-
dressed theoretically in previous research on 
training participation of low skilled workers. 
A qualitative study based on firm-level case 
studies in Germany could identify a number of 
favorable institutional influences and mecha-
nisms at the sectoral and company level 
(Wotschack & Solga 2014). Besides the (well-
known) factors that increase in-company train-
ing in general (such as a labor shortages, tech-
nological change, or an existing educational 
infrastructure) social and institutional embed-
dedness of the company proved to be an essen-
tial prerequisite for the integration of low-
skilled workers through training programs. This 
includes diverse company agreements and col-
lective regulations, long-term employment rela-
tions, worker representation, strong norms of 
solidarity, as well as tight cooperation between 
the corporate actors. Moreover, the high pro-
portion of low-skilled workers that participate 
in further training could not be explained by a 
single characteristic. In fact, several factors 
worked together in specific constellations. The 
integration of such social and institutional de-
terminants and constellations remains a gap in 
the quantitative research on further training. 
This article wants to close this gap in existing 
research by addressing the question, how insti-
tutional arrangements and HR strategies at the 
organizational level shape the training partici-
pation of low skilled workers, in addition to 
technological change, and labor shortages. The 
data base is the representative German IAB 
Establishment Survey provided by the German 
Institute for Employment research (IAB). The-
oretically, the study builds on insights from 
institutional organizational theory (Beckert 
1996; Granovetter 1985; Steinback et al. 2010). 
2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Theoretically, differences in training participa-
tion are usually explained by processes of se-
lection (by employers) and self-selection (by 
employees) (Ramos and Harris 2012; Wozny et 
al. 2016). Barriers at the individual level, such 
as the missing subjective perception of existing 
continuing education needs, lack of interest in 
continuing education, subjective learning barri-
ers or external constraints (such as family de-
mands) can prevent training participation – 
even when there are good opportunities at the 
organizational level (Martin and Rüber 2016). 
Many of these factors most frequently apply to 
low skilled workers (Mohr et al. 2016). Re-
garding the side of the employers, the willing-
ness to train workers tends to decrease when 
time or financial resources are scarce, when the 
expected returns to training are low, or if no 
need for training is perceived (Abramovsky et 
al. 2011). 
A common explanation for low training activi-
ties at the company level refers to problems of 
uncertainty (Osterbeek 1998). Transaction cost 
theory stresses the risk of opportunistic behav-
ior (Neubäumer et al. 2006; Williamson 1985). 
From the workers perspective, desired returns 
to training (such as financial benefits, job secu-
rity or promotion) can be denied by the em-
ployer. Employers, in contrast, bear the risk 
that training investments do not lead to the de-
sired gains in productivity. Moreover, returns 
to training are jeopardized by career interrup-
tions or employer change ("poaching"). In or-
der to cope with these risks organizations can 
introduce contractual arrangements (govern-
ance structures). Since it is costly to establish 
such arrangements, transaction costs are in-
creasing and make continuing training more 
costly. 
Alternative theoretical approaches such as filter 
theory explain the lower training participation 
of low skilled workers by the (mis)attribution 
of low and/or uncertain returns to training (Ar-
row 1973). According to this view, employers 
tend to ascribe lower returns and greater risk of 
loss of training investments to low skilled 
workers. Since they are not able to predict ac-
tual gains in productivity (due to training), they 
focus primarily on groups of people, where 
returns to training seem high and safe. Certain 
personal characteristics like the educational 
degree (measured in certificates), gender, age, 
or employment relationship serve as an (indi-
rect) indicator signaling lower risk and more 
gains in productivity. As a consequence, high 
skilled, young, male, full-time employed work-
ers are more likely to receive continuing train-
ing (Asplund 2005). 
Given the outlined theories, I expect that low 
skilled workers are more often included in con-
tinuing training when the company faces tech-
nological or organizational change (see Bell-
mann et al. 2015; Hirsch-Kreinsen 2016). Un-
der these conditions, organizations are forced 
to invest in training of low skilled workers (de-
spite negative attributions). Advanced produc-
tion technology, the introduction of new tech-
nology, digitization, and organizational change 
will increase the pressure to invest in training 
also for low skilled workers in order to enable 
them to adapt to new or advanced technology, 
work organization, or production processes 
(hypothesis H1). 
When we follow filter theory there is good rea-
son to be pessimistic about the chances and 
long-term prospects of low skilled workers to 
participate in continuing training. In the case of 
labor shortages or technological change, organ-
izations adapt to situational restrictions and do 
not follow a substantial long-term strategy. So I 
would expect that the positive effect on training 
participation of low skilled workers is rather 
weak and not enduring (hypothesis H2). As 
long as mechanisms of statistical discrimina-
tion are at work, the negative signal of a low or 
missing qualification (as an indicator of low or 
uncertain returns to training) will counteract 
training participation, in the long run even. So 
the question arises how mechanisms of statisti-
cal discrimination can be canceled out or at 
least reduced for low skilled workers in the 
long run. 
Institutional theories emphasize the importance 
of the social context for (solving) problems of 
uncertainty in economic exchange relations 
(Abraham 2001; Granovetter 1985; Beckert 
1996: 142). When we apply insights from these 
theories to the question of (overcoming) une-
qual training participation, we can derive the 
following hypotheses. 
At the organizational level, institutionalized 
regulations and structures of employee repre-
sentation can counteract the discrimination of 
low skilled workers by establishing alternative 
criteria for the distribution of training invest-
ments. I would expect a favorable influence of 
employee representations (works councils or 
other types of employee organization) and col-
lective agreements. When training investments 
are not (solely) driven by the economic criteri-
on of efficient returns but codetermined by 
employee representations (that are formally 
obliged to represent the entire work force also 
regarding issues of continuing training) or col-
lective agreements mechanisms of statistical 
discrimination should lose their power (hy-
pothesis H3). 
Following organizational theory (Steinback et 
al. 2010) workplace inequalities are also de-
termined by formal organizational practices 
(like institutionalized regulations or HR poli-
cies) that stabilize (or change) status hierar-
chies within workplaces. Training participation 
of low skilled workers should vary with the 
type and shape of HR strategies, ranging from 
more market and cost driven strategies to insti-
tutionalized and employee-oriented practices. I 
expect that low skilled workers are better off 
when training investments are governed by 
formalized, or employee-oriented HR policies 
(H4). When HR policies are concerned with 
issues of employability low skilled workers 
should receive more training due to their poorer 
employability. When the performance of low 
skilled workers is evaluated on a regular base 
by formalized measures, decisions on training 
participation should be based on (more) actual 
information on the real productivity of workers, 
and less on (negative) signals and ascribed at-
tributions by single managers. I expect a simi-
lar effect, when long-term employment rela-
tionships provide more information on the per-
formance of low skilled workers. 
3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The IAB Establishment Panel (Fischer et al. 
2009), waves 2011 and 2013, are used in order 
to test the outlined hypotheses. Data access was 
provided via on-site use at the Research Data 
Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employ-
ment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Em-
ployment Research (IAB) and subsequently 
remote data access. The IAB Establishment 
Panel provides elaborated information on com-
pany characteristics of about 12.000 German 
companies per year, including a detailed meas-
ure of (employer-provided) continuing training 
participation for different groups of employees. 
The Panel is based on a random sample select-
ed from all German companies registered at the 
German Federal Employment Agency’s (BA). 
The data collection was done via oral inter-
views with employers or employer representa-
tives based on a standardized questionnaire. 
The following analyses refer to the wave 2011 
because of its particular thematic focus on in-
stitutionalized HR practices. Information on 
training participation in 2011 and 2013 is used 
in order to observe short- und long-term effects 
of the selected organizational and sectoral 
characteristics. 
Following the definition of the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB) the focus is on 
employer-sponsored continuing training only. 
Thus, only training activities, which were (at 
least partly) funded by the employer in terms of 
investments of time and/or money are taken 
into account. 
All analyses are based on a sample of 6824 
establishments from wave 2011 with at least 
one low skilled worker and on a subsample of 
4016 establishments that participated in wave 
2011 and 2013. According to the IAB ques-
tionnaire low skilled workers are "workers do-
ing jobs that require no professional qualifica-
tion". This definition is based on the current job 
and not on the level of qualification of the em-
ployees. 
Dependent variables: The first dependent 
(dummy) variables are training investments 
(yes/ no) in low skilled workers in the first half 
of 2011 and the first half of 2013. It refers to 
the question: ‘was your establishment active in 
continuing vocational training in the first half 
of the year?’ When the answer was ‘Yes, work-
ing hours and/or financial resources were pro-
vided for continuing training", and “low skilled 
workers” (at least one) participated in continu-
ing training (in 2011, respectively 2013) the 
establishment was considered to support train-
ing of low skilled workers. The second depend-
ent (metric) variable is the training participa-
tion rate of low skilled workers defined as the 
share of low skilled workers that received train-
ing in 2011, respectively 2013. 
Explanatory variables: To capture a possible 
demand for innovation-related upskilling, a 
dummy variable was created. It is based on the 
question if the company has improved an exist-
ing service or product, developed a new service 
or new product, or introduced (new) processes 
for the improvement of production or services 
in 2010. Investment in EDP: A dummy variable 
indicates whether there were investments in 
‘computers, information and communication 
technology’ in 2010. 
Whether or not the HR policies are institution-
alized is measured by the question: ‘Does your 
establishment work with’: (a) ‘written plans for 
staff development?’, (b) ‘formally laid down 
procedures for appointments?’, (c) ‘job descrip-
tions for the majority of jobs?’, (d) ‘written 
target agreements with employees?’, (e) ‘writ-
ten evaluations of job performance?’. A factor 
analysis (main components analysis) confirms 
that one factor explains 62% of the total vari-
ance. The dummy variable for formalization of 
HR policies is encoded with a value of 1 for all 
companies that exhibit a positive factor charge, 
otherwise with the value 0. 
Differences in the orientation of HR policies 
are measured by the following indicator: ‘How 
important are the following strategies for your 
establishment to meet future needs for skilled 
workers?’ HR policies are classified as em-
ployee oriented (versus cost-cutting and out-
sourcing strategies) when they conform highly 
to the following strategies: ‘keeping older 
workers longer in the company’, ‘long-term 
personal development of employees', ‘improv-
ing the reconciliation of family and working 
life’, or ‘creating attractive work conditions’. A 
factor analysis confirms that one factor ex-
plained the four items of 47% of the total vari-
ance. The dummy variable for an employee-
oriented HR policy has a value of 1 for all es-
tablishments with a positive factor charge. 
Long-term employment relationships: When the 
company reports that all employees of the 
company have permanent employment con-
tracts longer employment periods are assumed. 
Tow dummy variables were created indicating 
whether or not there is a works council or other 
form of employee representation in the compa-
ny and whether or not the company is covered 
by a collective agreement. 
4 RESULTS 
In a first step, logistic and OLS regression 
analyses have been carried out in order to study 
the role of technology, labor shortages, innova-
tion, institutional arrangements, and HR strate-
gies on continuing training participation of low 
skilled workers (Table 1). Most company char-
acteristics have been observed in 2011. Only 
for the business situation, labor shortages, in-
vestments in EDP, and recent innovations (re-
garding work organization, products, services, 
or the production process) retro perspective 
information referring to 2010 was used. De-
pendent variables are investments (yes/no) in 
continuing training of low skilled workers (in 
terms of time or money) and training participa-
tion rates of low skilled workers in 2011 and 
2013. 
(*) significant 10% level; * significant 5% level; * significant 1% level; 
Control variables: Company size, compound operation, business 
situation, employment development, work force composition, infra-
structure for training, region (East-/West-Germany), sectors (15 dum-
my variables) 
Source: IAB establishment Panel, waves 2011, 2013; own calculations, 
only companies with low skilled workers 
Table 1: Determinants of training investments in low skilled 
workers: Logistic regression analysis (average marginal 
effects; standard errors in parentheses) 
In line with hypotheses H1 and H2 the analyses 
confirm (see Table 1, Table 2) that modern 
production technology and investments in EDP 
have a significant positive effect on training 
investments (in 2011 and 2013) but not on 
training participation rates of low skilled work-
ers. Recent technological or organizational in-
novations (in 2010) have a positive effect on 
training investments for low skilled workers in 
2011 and 2013, but training participation rates 
of low skilled workers are only affected in 
2011. With other words (and in line with H2), 
the included technological determinants do not 
significantly affect training participation rates 
of low skilled workers. If they do so (in case of 
recent innovations) their effect is not enduring. 
Regarding the role of the institutional organiza-
tional context (H3), the analyses confirms the 
positive impact of employee representations on 
both the chance of training investments in low 
skilled workers (Table 1) as well as their train-
ing participation rate in the short (2011) and in 
the long run (2013). In line with the theoretical 
expectations we find evidence that employee 
representations contribute significantly and 
continuously to higher levels of training partic-
ipation among low skilled workers.
(*) significant 10% level; * significant 5% level; * significant 1% level; 
same control variables as listed in Table 1 
Source: IAB establishment Panel, waves 2011, 2013; own calculations, 
only companies with low skilled workers 
Table 2: Determinants of training participation rates of low 
skilled workers: OLS regression analysis (standardized 
coefficients; standard errors in parentheses)
Regarding the role of collective bargaining 
coverage empirical evidence is rather weak. 
Collective agreements are positively related to 
the chance that the company has invested in 
continuing training for low skilled workers in 
2011 (though this effect is only significant at 
the 10%-level), but not in 2013 (presumably 
due to the smaller number of cases). For both 
years, there is no significant effect of collective 
agreements on the training participation rate of 
low skilled workers. 
With regard to the role of HR strategies (H4), 
the analysis confirms that the likelihood of 
training investments was significantly higher 
for low skilled workers (in 2011 and 2013) 
when the company was characterized by for-
malized HR practices. Regarding the effects of 
Continuing training for 
low skilled workers (yes/no) 
Model M1 (2011) M2 (2013) 
Explanatory variables 
(wave 2011) 
Investments in EDP (2010) 
Recent innovation (2010) 
0.03** (0.01) 
0.04** (0.01) 
0.03* (0.01) 
 0.02(*) 0.01) 
Modern production technology  0.03** (0.01)   0.02(*) (0.01) 
Collective agreement 
Formalized HR practices 
Employee-oriented HR policies 
Long-term contracts 
Employee representation 
0.02(*) (0.01) 
0.08** (0.01) 
0.04** (0.01) 
-0.04**(0.01) 
0.03* (0.01) 
0.01 (0.01) 
 0.09** (0.02) 
 0.04** (0.01) 
-0.04* (0.02) 
  0.05** (0.02) 
Pseudo R2 
n (establishments) 
0.19 
6824 
0.18 
4016 
Training participation rate 
low skilled workers 
Model M3 (2011) M4 (2013) 
Explanatory variables 
(wave 2011) 
Investments in EDP (2010) 
Recent innovation (2010) 
0.02 (0.01) 
0.03* (0.01) 
0.07 (0.05) 
-0.07 (0.01)
Modern production technology  0.02 (0.01) 0.00 (0.05) 
Collective agreement 
Formalized HR practices 
Employee-oriented HR policies 
Long-term contracts 
Employee representation 
0.01 (0.02) 
0.03* (0.02) 
0.04** (0.01) 
0.00 (0.02) 
0.06** (0.02) 
-0.01 (0.05)
 0.11(*) (0.02) 
0.00 (0.04) 
-0.05 (0.05)
  0.11(*) (0.06) 
Adjusted R2 
n (establishments) 
0.04 
6824 
0.01 
4016 
employee-oriented HR policies empirical evi-
dence is less clear. In line with hypothesis H4, 
they are related to a higher likelihood of short 
(2011) and long-term (2013) investments in 
training of low skilled workers (see Table 1). 
Regarding (higher) participation rates of low 
skilled workers (see Table 2) there is only evi-
dence for a significant effect in 2011 but not in 
2013 (presumably caused by changes in the 
management). The positive impact of long-term 
employment relationships is not confirmed by 
the data. We even find evidence for an opposite 
effect: Companies with (exclusively) perma-
nent employment contracts are less likely to 
invest in training of low skilled workers. 
The explained variance of models M3 and M4 
(Table 2) is low (4%) indicating that the overall 
impact of company characteristics on training 
participation of low skilled workers is limited. 
One possible explanation are mechanisms of 
self-selection: while the decision of employers 
to invest in training for low skilled workers 
depends strongly on the company context, the 
share of workers who take up training opportu-
nities is largely affected by other determinants 
(Frazis et al. 2000). 
Apart from the outlined institutional influences, 
training participation of low skilled workers 
varies with a number of control variables. In 
line with findings from previous studies (Bell-
mann et al. 2015), labor shortages, infrastruc-
ture and staff for training have a positive im-
pact on training participation of low skilled 
workers in 2011 (but not in 2013). Smaller 
companies are less likely to invest time or 
money in continuing training of low skilled 
workers. In establishments with a large share of 
low skilled workers training investments and 
training participation of low skilled workers are 
significantly higher. 
Furthermore, the likelihood of training invest-
ments for low skilled workers is positively re-
lated to compound operation, work force com-
position, (higher) turnover rates, regional, and 
sectoral differences. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This article addressed a major dilemma of low 
skilled workers in Europe: Though continuing 
training forms a key measure to improve their 
labor market position and to cope with funda-
mental changes in the world of work (like the 
digitalization), their participation in continuing 
training remains very low. 
Since particularly low and uncertain returns to 
training are often attributed to low skilled 
workers this group is included less often in 
continuing training. Against this background, 
the article explored the role of technological 
change, HR strategies, and institutional organi-
zational arrangements to overcome this prob-
lem. To my best knowledge, previous research 
has not addressed this issue so far. 
The article derived from the idea that institu-
tional arrangements are able to prevent the dis-
crimination of low skilled workers substantial-
ly. By either providing more information on the 
actual productivity of low skilled workers, or 
establishing non-economic criteria for training 
investments they increase the chance that firms 
continuously integrate (more) low skilled 
workers in continuing training. The effect of 
technological change and innovation, in con-
trast, is rather limited for this group of workers 
as long as mechanisms of discrimination are at 
work. 
Analyses of data of the IAB establishment Pan-
el (wave 2011, 2013) confirmed this expecta-
tion widely. While there is clear evidence that 
recent innovations, modern production tech-
nology, or investments in EDP have a direct 
positive effect on the likelihood of training 
investments for low skilled workers, empirical 
evidence regarding substantial and enduring 
effects is weak. Institutionalized arrangements 
in terms of employee representations and for-
malized HR policies, in contrast, are related to 
continuously higher levels of training participa-
tion among low skilled workers. Additional 
analysis (not reported here) show evidence that 
low skilled workers benefit most in organiza-
tional clusters that are characterized by struc-
tures of employee representation, formalized 
HR practices, and employee-oriented HR poli-
cies. 
The results of this study underline the im-
portance of institutional arrangements and HR 
practices at the organizational level. A major 
role is played by structures of employee repre-
sentation and formalized HR practices, such as 
written plans for staff development, formally 
laid down procedures for vacant appointments, 
job descriptions, written target agreements, or 
written evaluations of job performance. For the 
large number of enterprises without employee 
representations and formalized HR policies 
substitute regulations and initiatives at the col-
lective bargaining and state level are needed. 
Collective agreements might play an important 
role, too. Yet, their overall impact on the train-
ing participation of low skilled workers is still 
weak. This underlines the need to incorporate 
more binding regulations on continuing train-
ing in order to commit companies to take care 
of their workers’ long-term employability. 
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